REFLECTIONS ON A STRATEGIC VISION FOR COMPUTER NETWORK OPERATIONS
Where there is no vision, the people perish.
-Proverbs 29:18 1 US Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC's) are unprepared to effectively plan computer network operations (CNO) and incorporate them into military operations.
This condition is not due to any failure of GCC commanders to recognize their warfighting responsibility. Current legal authorities and national policy enable CNO primarily at the strategic level of war. They marginalize GCC CNO planning efforts by denying commanders CNO decision-making authority in the more decisive operational cyberwar. This paper will discuss the efficacy of this current approach to CNO within a framework of its missing component: a Department of Defense (DoD) strategic vision for how to use CNO to help win wars in the cyberspace domain.
GCC's do not have sufficient authority to integrate CNO into their operational plans. The authority to procure computer network attack (CNA) capabilities (i.e, tools and weapons) is held by the Services. 2 GCC authority to conduct cyber attacks remains remarkably limited. 3 A Functional Combatant Command (FCC), USSTRATCOM, directs the overall operation and defense of the GCC's computer networks. 4 Additionally, the intelligence collection component of computer network exploitation (CNE) is a function of the intelligence community (IC). GCC's are unable to integrate CNO into their planning process because they do not sufficiently control any of the pillars of CNO.
An additional deficiency that exacerbates this situation is that DoD has no comprehensive CNO strategic vision; -that picture of future changes desired by governmental elites [that] takes into account the probabilities of informed extrapolations 2 of current foreign and domestic trend lines that will affect national security.‖ 5 Strategic vision describes a realistic and compelling future orientation and provides a strategy to achieve it. 6 In today's existing cyberwar, the US has yet to conceptualize a way to win.
It is necessary to take an objective look at this current situation in order to begin creating a strategic vision for how DoD will plan CNO and fight successfully in cyberspace. This paper starts by examining the nature and object of war in cyberspace and the role that CNO plays in it. Next, it identifies key definitions and discusses their implications. It follows with an examination of relevant national strategic guidance, the DoD organizations bound by it, and trends in DoD cyberspace activities. This paper evaluates each of these in terms of its importance to developing a strategic vision. It then makes recommendations for a future CNO planning environment that better serves US national security interests.
Strategic versus Operational Cyberwar
-The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have is to establish... the kind of war on which they are embarking.‖ 7 This section examines cyberspace war (i.e., cyberwar), its relationship to physical war, and the use of CNO to cause effects at both the strategic and operational levels of war.
There are several unofficial definitions of cyberwar; however, there is currently no authoritative definition in joint doctrine. 8 A general description is that cyberwar is a composite of offensive, defensive, and enabling actions taken in and through the cyberspace domain to compel a state or non-state actor to do the will of an opponent actor. 9 DoD supports both strategic and operational cyberwar but is not currently well postured for the latter. Strategic cyberwar must seek ends that are more limited than those of physical war. Its enabling assumption, therefore, is that all opponents agree to keep the war non-physical. 12 In a case where one adversary sufficiently denied another's access to cyberspace, the victim would likely escalate to physical war before it would surrender its objective. Escalation to physical conflict, however, causes the nature of a cyberwar to shift from strategic cyberwar to operational cyberwar; one in which operations conducted in cyberspace play a supporting, rather than the dominant role in the overall war. The only realistic ends of strategic cyberwar, therefore, are to frustrate an opponent, exhaust that opponent's resources and to deter escalation to physical war.
The achievable ends of the current US strategic cyberwar against various global cyber threats must, for these reasons, be limited to cyber-deterrence and cyber-defense.
Operational Cyberwar. follows that operational cyberwar is more appropriate for them than it is for the FCC (i.e., USSTRATCOM/USCYBERCOM) and the national intelligence agencies that are currently better resourced for its execution.
Unlike strategic cyberwar, operational cyberwar is potentially decisive. 16 It can achieve three basic objectives. 17 The first is to create a surprise cyber attack that can cripple a capability the enemy will rely on having at a specific time or for a specific event (e.g., a distributed denial of service cyber attack against a critical node in an opponent's
Intelligence network). The second is to use a CNO capability as a tactical weapon in order to achieve a temporary, but potentially decisive advantage during an operational campaign (e.g., a cyber attack against a fire control network's human-machine interface (HMI)). The third, used sparingly, can disrupt an enemy's confidence in networked systems, causing shifts to less efficient forms of command and control (C2), propaganda, fundraising, recruiting and training (e.g., attacks to randomly redirect C2 emails and webpage access attempts). The ability to plan CNO is critical because effective operations in this domain are -the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and operational domainssecuring freedom from attack and the freedom to attack.‖ 23 Without the ability to plan effective CNO at the GCC's, military operations in all other domains are at risk.
Cyberspace Operations, Network Operations (NETOPS), and the Global Information Grid (GIG).
A term closely related to cyberspace is -cyberspace operations,‖ which is -the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include CNO and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid (GIG).‖ 24 This definition implies that -cyberspace operations‖ consists of at least two distinct activities, CNO and -activities to operate and defend the GIG.‖
The definition of network operations (NETOPS) is -activities conducted to operate and defend the GIG.‖ 25 Therefore, cyberspace operations include a combination of CNO and NETOPS.
The GIG is -the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for acquiring, processing, storing, transporting, controlling, and presenting information on demand to joint fires and support personnel.‖ 26 Since the infrastructure defined here is on demand to joint fires and support personnel, reference to the GIG means the DoD portion of the internet. This definition of CNO implies that -CNA, CND, and related CNE enabling operations‖ are different activities. The implication from the definition of -cyberspace operations‖ is that CNO is an -operation‖ to achieve objectives that contribute to the -employment of cyber capabilities‖ in or through cyberspace. It then follows that CNO is essentially a planning function that results in some integrated, coordinated, and synchronized operation that is a combination of actions associated with CNA, CND, and related CNE enabling operations. is an offensive activity. As such, the authority to conduct a CNA belongs to the operations community. The IC, however, plays a significant role in preparing military operators to execute CNA. Its role involves conducting CNE and providing related intelligence support to the operations community in order for an attack to be effective.
Computer Network Operations (CNO).

Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).
Current policy correctly assigns responsibility for operational maneuver to GCC commanders but, unfortunately, reserves much of the authority to execute supporting CNA to USSTRATCOM. The first issue of concern with this policy is that it conditions the IC to deal more directly with an FCC than it does with the supported GCC. The second issue is that this policy complicates GCC efforts to conduct CNO planning.
In order to achieve the defensive and deterrent ends of the strategic cyberwar, it is appropriate that the IC maintain its close supporting relationship with USSTRATCOM.
In fighting the neglected operational cyberwar, though, the IC must support the GCC's in a similarly direct and timely manner. A strategic vision should propose an equally close supporting relationship between the IC and the GCC's. Without it, CNO planning is further complicated due to reduced intelligence timeliness and insufficient network intelligence detail provided to the GCC's planning staff.
CNA-Operational Preparation of the Environment (CNA-OPE). CNA-OPE is an
operational authority related to the authority to conduct CNA. CNA-OPE is -operations conducted to gain and/or confirm access to, and gather key information on the targeted network concerning the capabilities and configuration of, targeted networks or systems 9 and to facilitate target acquisition and target analysis in preparation for CNA and/or other offensive missions.‖ 31 This is the authority to use cyberspace tools to gain access to targeted computers and computer networks in order to determine their continued relevance and confirm attack parameters, as long as its intent is not the collection of intelligence. A GCC can consider CNA-OPE to be similar to the -related CNE enabling operations‖ discussed in the CNO definition section above.
A pre-requisite for the GCC to execute CNA-OPE is that IC must first provide an initial description of the key network links and nodes against which the attack will occur.
The GCC commander can then better conduct CNA-OPE in order to ensure access and validate attack parameters before executing a successful CNA. A strategic vision for CNO should emphasize this GCC requirement. There is often confusion about the difference between CND and the -defend‖ role identified in the definition of NETOPS. In theory, the difference is that CND considers the potential impact of cyber threats from outside the network. NETOPS considers the reliability and efficiency of the network that can be achieved by -hardening‖ it from the inside. As a practical matter, the personnel with CND expertise are the same individuals that do NETOPS; the information technology (IT) professionals normally assigned to the Communications (G/S-6) section and similar, specialized organizations. executed to prevent an ongoing or anticipated attack against the friendly network from being more effective than it would be without an aggressive response.
Computer Network Defense (CND). CND is defined as -actions
In practice, CNO is a planning function that integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes the five activities identified above: CNA, CNA-OPE, CND, CND-RA, and CNE. The CNO planner performs none of these activities. The planner's job is to communicate with the individuals, organizations, and agencies that execute the activities and coordinate for their conduct to support the military objectives articulated by the commander.
To support the requirements of the strategic cyberwar, current national policies retain most authorities and resources for the execution of the five activities at national strategic organizations and agencies. This has a detrimental effect on GCC's because it negatively affects their ability to plan and execute CNO in support of the operational cyberwar. The following section includes a more detailed examination of these national policies.
National Strategic Direction
Much of the guidance published about cyberspace operations and CNO is classified. This section is, therefore, limited in its scope by the guidance available at the unclassified level. A strategic vision should evaluate the necessity of maintaining so much of the relevant discussion at the classified level. Perhaps the broader operations community could provide better insights once it is more widely informed from new unclassified literature and discussion. 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS
Cyberspace Policy Review (CPR, also known as "The 60-day Review").
Conducted shortly after President Obama took office, the CPR emphasizes the need for the nation to take immediate action to secure cyber-space. It provides both near-and 
The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO).
An unclassified, publically available version of the NMS-CO offers guidance that supports this paper's thesis; that the ability to plan and conduct CNO should not be limited primarily to national-strategic organizations. Subordinate echelons can achieve decisive results if given appropriate authorities and CNO capabilities.
The NMS-CO declares, -operations to achieve desired effects in and through cyberspace require integration of organizations, capabilities, functions, technologies, and mission.‖ 42 It is also specific about the responsibility of military leaders. First, it 14 directs that -senior leaders must establish a structure that integrates all mission areas and dismantles stove-piped organizations that hinder collaboration and lengthen decision-making cycles.‖ 43 It guides more than just the responsibility of senior leaders.
The NMS-CO warns that the DoD will also -hold leaders at all levels responsible and accountable for cyberspace operations in the same manner as accountability is addressed in the other domains.‖ 44 The current practice of maintaining most CNA authorities and capabilities at national strategic organizations is inconsistent with the NMS-CO. The NMS-CO shows that Defense Department policy favors a decentralized, cross-echelon distribution of CNO authorities, capabilities, and planning responsibilities.
The practice of executing a national policy, which stresses interagency coordination due to its focus on strategic cyber defense and cyber deterrence, fails to loosen the reigns of centralization that impede the effective conduct of the operational cyberwar by the GCC's. A strategic vision for CNO planning might emphasize a need to restructure organizations, C2, training, and the allocation of cyber resources. The EW community, for example, is becoming concerned that the convergence of electronic and computer technology may eventually result in their community becoming absorbed into the cyberspace community. The EW community, operating under Title 10 operational authorities, has enjoyed relatively simple execution authorities in the past. Once aligned with the CNO community, however, they are afraid that they will lose their flexibility to conduct operations. Additionally, SIGINT personnel employ many of the same technologies used by the EW community. The SIGINT community is large and well funded whereas the EW community is a relatively small 19 community which few senior leaders truly understand. The concern is that SIGINT personnel will eventually execute EW missions rather than simply support them.
The most telling sign of this trend, though, is that in the establishment of USCYBERCOM, the officer chosen to lead it was not from the operations community, but from the SIGINT community (i.e., DirNSA). This most significant CNO command assignment could have been a Title 10 operational commander (with authority for CNA and CND) who gained an expanded mission that included Title 50 CNE authority.
Instead, an existing Title 50 commander (i.e., DirNSA) gained an expanded Title 10 mission. If USCYBERCOM is to better integrate CNO for the GCC's, a strategic vision should address whether an intelligence operative can achieve that goal better than if a military operator were in command.
Recommendations
This research has identified several issues that a strategic vision for CNO could address. The areas in which they find consensus with the views of other writers, commanders, planners, and practitioners could form the basis for a unifying strategic vision about CNO. The following are some initial recommendations for that vision.
First, national strategic leaders should immediately apportion to the GCC's appropriate legal authorities, cyber resources, and trained personnel, empowering them to organically plan and conduct operational cyberwar. The primary advantage of doing this is that it will enable the GCC's to directly plan and employ CNO capabilities in support of decisive operational actions that achieve overall strategic ends. The chief disadvantage is that it will decrease the overall capability of USCYBERCOM by redirecting some of the CNO resources programmed to support it. The chief risk is that by refocusing NSA and the IC on the GCC's, they will lose focus on the strategic 20 cyberwar. This is unlikely, though, since the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the President determine the national intelligence priorities.
Second, the SECDEF should develop and approve a plan to mature subordinate CNO JTF's at each GCC within the next year. The plan should direct each SCC supporting a GCC to establish a CNO proponent to coordinate with USCYBERCOM and NSA. Each GCC should establish a Cyberspace Coordinating Authority (CCA) to oversee all CNO proponent issues with the CNO stakeholder community. The plan should direct that the Services augment the SCC CNO proponents and GCC CCA's with trained CNO personnel. It should also establish the objective of maturing these organizations into a standing CNO JTF, with appropriate legal authorities and organic CNO capabilities, at each GCC within ten years. The great advantage of this is that it enables the warfighting commanders the ability to employ CNO decisively in support of operational maneuver when it is applicable. Its main disadvantages are that it requires significant personnel and other resources that the Services are not currently programmed to provide. The greatest risk, though, is having US operational forces face enemies who shape operations with a devastating cyber attack followed quickly with a vigorous physical one. 56 Third, training programs that teach military CNO technical capabilities and planning skills should be significantly expanded throughout DoD. This should also include the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures that are more extensive and kept at the unclassified level where possible. The advantage of this is that it will standardize both the lexicon and the processes for conducting CNO. The main disadvantage is that it will be difficult to gain wide consensus on the best 21 approach. Nonetheless, the risk of not choosing a reasonable end state that empowers the GCC's leaves US operational forces relatively unarmed for battle in the cyberspace domain.
Fourth, the next commander of USCYBERCOM should be a former GCC commander. This commander should also be dual-hatted as the DirNSA while an intelligence officer remains the Deputy DirNSA. The main advantage of this is that it will bring greater operational perspective to cyberspace operations and to the SIGINT community. Its chief disadvantage is that it will likely encounter extensive resistance from the IC. The risk, however, is that maintaining the focus of the IC on the strategic cyberwar at the expense of the operational cyberwar puts the successful accomplishment of both in jeopardy.
Conclusion
This research indicates the national strategic community has focused on enabling a few key military organizations to support its fight in the strategic cyberwar.
While this is well intentioned, it has not enabled the GCC's to succeed in the potentially more decisive operational cyberwar. Military adversaries that would challenge US strategic interests remain likely to engage GCC's in synchronized cyber and physical attacks at the operational level of war. It is time to empower the GCC's to fight them.
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